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Abstract 
From the mid-1820s, banks became the first business sector in Great Britain and 
Ireland to be granted the right to form freely on an unlimited liability joint stock 
basis. Walter Bagehot, the renowned contemporary banking expert, warned that 
shares in such banks would ultimately be owned by widows, orphans and other 
impecunious individuals. An alternative hypothesis is that the governing bodies 
of these banks constrained by special legal restrictions on share trading acted 
effectively to prevent such shares being transferred to the less wealthy members 
of society. We test both conjectures using the archives of an Irish joint stock 
bank. The results do not support Bagehot’s hypothesis, but instead indicate that 
shares continued to be owned by wealthy individuals.   
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Conforming to liberalisation trends elsewhere, firms in Great Britain and 
Ireland were allowed to establish freely on an unlimited liability joint stock 
basis from the early 1820s.
1  This liberalisation was initiated with Irish banks, 
which could constitute freely on a joint stock basis as early as 1825
2, and was 
then extended to English banks the following year.
3  Eventually all firms could 
freely constitute on a joint stock basis from 1844.
4     
 
The unlimited liability joint stock institutional form introduced into banking 
under the 1825 and 1826 Acts had a relatively long life, lasting until the general 
adoption of limited liability just after 1879.
5  As joint stock banks operated 
without any other type of legal constraint apart from restrictions placed on note 
issues, a crucial issue was how secure were their deposit liabilities.  As 
contemporaries fully realised, the security of deposits, in large part, depended 
on bank-owners’ personal wealth.
6  Just how much personal wealth secured 
deposits was subject to severe and relentless criticism by Walter Bagehot, the 
well-known author of Lombard Street.
7  Bagehot (1862, p.397) in an article in 
The Economist argued, albeit without offering much in the way of evidence, that 
the shareholders of unlimited banks ‘do not object to subject all their property to 
liability, because they have no property’.  Similarly, he stated elsewhere that 
‘we enact that every person joining a bank shall be liable for every sixpence 
contained in it, to his last acre and shilling.  The consequence is, that persons 
who join banks have very commonly but few acres and few shillings’.
8   
Bagehot, writing in the mid-1850s, admitted that many banks had wealthy 
owners, but he believed that this would not remain the case.
9  Eschewing the 
belief in the brand name capital argument, Bagehot implicitly argued that all 
bank shares would ultimately end up being owned by widows, orphans and the 
impecunious.
10  Thus, these banks would become de facto limited, leaving 
deposits unsecured.   
 
As Bagehot implicitly realised, the bid price for bank shares depended on a 
buyer’s wealth, with the most impecunious willing to bid the most.   
Nevertheless, an alternative conjecture is that the governing bodies of the banks 
constrained by the legislation governing the formation of joint stock banks 
operated to prevent shares being transferred to impecunious individuals.  If the 
legal and institutional constraints were effective, new owners would be selected 
on the basis of meeting some minimum wealth requirements rather than on the 
basis of bid prices alone.  
 
Using the business archives of an Irish joint stock bank, we examine the wealth 
characteristics of new bank investors.  In particular, we analyse the occupational  
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and social profiles of individual investors.  Using information from the probated 
wills of individual investors, we also analyse their wealth characteristics. In 
addition, using a proxy for information, we measure the information-gathering 
activities of individual sellers and the bank’s governing body. We also present 
evidence on the wealth and shareholding characteristics of the individuals 
comprising the governing body to ascertain whether or not they had sufficient 
incentives to vet share transfers. Finally, we also test whether or not the 
governing body operated some mechanism that admitted low wealth investors 
provided they pay a compensatory premium. 
 
Our findings suggest that the shares of the Irish joint stock bank were not 
transferred to impecunious individuals, even in periods when there was an 
increased probability of bank distress, indicating little support for Bagehot’s 
view. We also find that the governing body contained the largest and wealthiest 
shareholders, indicating that this body had sufficient incentives to vet share 
transfers. Furthermore, we observe that the vast majority of investors lived in 
close proximity to the branches of our bank, indicating that the governing body 
may have used the branch network to gather information on prospective 
investors. We also have little evidence to indicate that the governing 
implemented a price discrimination policy whereby investors paid a different 
price for bank shares dependent on their wealth. 
 
While we focus on nineteenth-century Irish banks, our study has a much broader 
significance. A recent debate amongst legal scholars has centred on what impact 
introducing unlimited liability for corporate torts would have upon the capital 
markets.
11 Furthermore, modern economists recognise the issue raised by 
Bagehot, and several have suggested that the transferability of shares carrying 
unlimited liability may need to be somehow impaired.
12  However, despite a lot 
of debate concerning the unlimited liability firm, there is very little evidence as 
to how unlimited liability joint stock firms operated in the past (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 1991, p.1924-5, Grossman, 1995).
13   
 
 
2. A Rationalisation of the Bagehot Hypothesis  
 
In this section, we analyse under what conditions Bagehot's hypothesis may or 
may not hold.  Given unlimited liability bank ownership and the condition that 
investors know each other’s wealth, each incumbent surplus-wealth shareowner, 
ceteris paribus, would always value his ownership share less than any other 
individual with less surplus wealth.
 14 For the same reason, the shares of such a 
bank would be most valued by any individual whose share ownership 
approximates their total wealth. This conjecture derives from the fact that  
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whereas for each co-owner, the return from investment is proportional to his 
share of bank ownership, the cost is proportional to the level of their overall 
wealth, which, under certain conditions, is liable to claim by bank creditors. The 
conditions are that the bank has insufficient internal assets to meet its 
obligations in the eventuality of bankruptcy and that a subsection of co-owners 
are unable to meet their pro rata share of obligations to the extent that the entire 
wealth of each investor becomes liable. 
 
To see the above better, consider the following example in which banks operate 
in a competitive environment, having no barriers to entry. This implies that bank 
owners earn zero expected economic profits over the long term. For simplicity, 
we also assume that ownership of the bank is equally divided among its initial 
owners all of whom enjoy similar levels of surplus wealth, implying ceteris 
paribus, all initial owners value their ownership equally.  Under these 
circumstances, an unexpected transfer of ownership share by any initial owner 
to any buyer having substantially less surplus wealth than the incumbent owners 
must impose a significant pecuniary externality on remaining co-owners or on 
pre-existing depositors. The extent of the imposed externality would be 
proportional to the difference in surplus wealth between the buyer and the seller. 
Since any initial owner can extract rents by transferring ownership to any buyer 
having less surplus wealth, this raises the question as to whether all initial 
owners will ultimately transfer their shares to impecunious buyers, or whether 
some subset of initial owners will find it in their interest to prevent this 
occurrence.  
 
As hinted at by Bagehot (1862a,b) the key to resolving this issue depends on 
depositor expectations in regard to the overall riskiness of the bank. We consider 
the more interesting case where owners are risk neutral and depositors are risk 
averse. If, as Bagehot believed, depositors remain ignorant of the bank’s dilution 
of the level of wealth backing the bank’s public liabilities, then the full cost of 
such share transfers are borne by depositors, and, as Bagehot clearly 
hypothesised, each surviving bank would become de facto limited. At the other 
extreme, when it is assumed that depositors are fully informed and there is a 
competitive market for bank shares, depositors will demand a higher fully 
compensatory risk premium from the bank owners, with the result that the 
remaining group of initial owners now suffer a negative return of greater 
magnitude than the distributional rent enjoyed by the seller.  In contrast, given a 
sufficiently large number of potential bidders, the buyer will only earn a normal 
return that sufficiently compensates him for his share of the increased cost from 
the higher risk premium imposed by rational depositors.   
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In the absence of compensation to co-owners, if initial surplus wealth 
shareowners are unable to prevent the free transfer of shares, the unlimited joint 
stock bank would not be established in the first place.  In the absence of such a 
scheme, one possibility is that initial owners would need to establish some anti-
wealth-diluting mechanism to make the institution viable.  Along these lines, a 
possibility is that co-owners can simply vet any buyer before validating any 
ownership transfer.
15  This scheme would also be costly, as it would require the 
bank to acquire detailed information on each buyer. Another possibility, 
requiring only the knowledge of the standard deviation and mean of potential 
buyers for any known wealth distribution in the market for shares, would be for 
co-owners to simply set a price for each share transfer to ensure a certain level 
of surplus wealth for all new owners.  
 
Above, we argued that once a bank has been established, there is no tendency 
toward dilution of surplus wealth. However, we have not discussed what 
determines the level of surplus wealth or ownership shares. For a given degree 
of depositor risk aversion, the greater the magnitude of aggregate surplus wealth 
of shareowners, the lower the risk premium.  Indeed, given our assumption that 
depositors exhibit decreasing risk aversion, the risk premium can be expected to 
decline at an increasing rate. But as owners are risk neutral, correlated with a 
given risk premium, there is a particular minimum level of share ownership that 
allows each investor to cover his costs of ownership associated with his wealth 
level. Thus for a given risk premium there is an optimal magnitude of surplus 
wealth and share ownership.   Therefore the level of risk premium is ultimately 
determined by the extent of depositor risk aversion.  Conceivably, though 
unlikely, if depositor risk-aversion behaviour follows some distribution, it is 
possible for initial owners, having low surplus wealth and diffused ownership, 
to target that portion of the market. Thus, Bagehot’s de facto limited liability 
bank might arise for some banks where all the initial shareowners establishing 
the bank had zero surplus wealth.
16          
Above we imposed the assumption that banks operated in a competitive 
environment earned zero profits.  More realistically, we should expect such 
banks to average zero profits over the business cycle. This implies that a 
competitive bank will earn positive profits in boom years to offset negative 
profits during recessions. In particularly deep recession years, the prospect of 
bank insolvency dramatically increases, and existing owners would collectively 
and individually want to exit the bank by offloading their ownership shares. 
Consequently, rational depositors will require shareowners to provide a credible 
commitment not to exit in such periods. The post-sale-extended liability 
requirement imposed under the Banking Copartnerships Regulation Act of 1825 
(6 Geo. IV, c.42) would have fulfilled this role.
17  Specifically, section 18 of this 
Act specified that in the case where existing shareholders were unable to fully  
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meet all debt obligations, former owners having sold their ownership within the 
three-year extended liability period then became liable for remaining debts of 
the bank.
18  After the 1862 Companies Act, banks were permitted to abandon 
their old co-partnership constitutions and register as unlimited liability 
companies. One of the main benefits to shareowners of doing this was a 
reduction from three years to one year for which a member was liable after they 
had sold their shares. (Crick and Wadsworth, 1936, p.33). 
 
Interestingly, section 22 of the Irish Banking Copartnership Regulation Act 
specified that “no share transfer shall take place without the consent of the 
directors; nor is any transfer valid unless signed by one or more of such 
directors”. However, as argued above, it would be in the self-interest of the 
initial co-owners to set up such a structure. Therefore, it appears that this section 
22 was somewhat redundant. Notably, the English Banking Copartnership Act 
(1826) had the post-sale-extended liability requirement of the Irish Banking 
Copartnership Regulation Act, but did not have section 22. It appears that 
English bank promoters voluntarily inserted such clauses into their bank’s deeds 
of copartnership (Plumptre, 1882, p.444). 
 
The enactment of the post-sale-extended liability requirement raises the issue as 
to whether it would have been feasible for shareowners to adopt a similar 
provision voluntarily in their deeds of co-partnership. Mitigating against such a 
possibility is that such a provision could have been eliminated at the most 
expedient time, which would correspond with an increase in bank distress.   
 
The rest of the paper analyses the trading of shares in an unlimited liability bank 
and tests the implications arising from this section. First, we test the validity of 
Bagehot’s hypothesis by specifically examining the wealth and occupational 
characteristics of our bank investors. We then explore the bank’s governing 
structure by examining the wealth and ownership of the individuals serving on 
the bank’s governing bodies. To test for the extent of information gathering, we 
measure the distance between buyers and sellers and the branches of our Irish 
bank.  Finally, we test for the existence of price discrimination on the basis of 
wealth.            
        
                   
3.  The Ulster Banking Company 
 
We chose to test Bagehot’s hypothesis using the Ulster Banking Company 
(UBC) because its publicly accessible archives contain share transfer journals 
which recorded the details of every share transfer made.
19 Unfortunately, for 
most banks such detailed records are not easily accessible as they are deemed to  
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have little archival value.
20 Fortunately, as we demonstrate below, this bank is a 
good example to study as a priori it would be most favourable to Bagehot's 
view. 
 
The UBC opened in July 1836 to service the banking needs of the growing city 
of Belfast and its surrounding districts (Ollerenshaw, 1987, p.46). Originally it 
registered under the Banking Copartnerships Regulation Act (1825), but at the 
Annual General Meeting of 1867, it was unanimously resolved “that the Ulster 
Banking Company shall be registered as an Unlimited Liability Company, 
under the Companies Act, 1862”.
21 By 1874, the bank, one of nine commercial 
banks in Ireland, had forty-three branches mainly concentrated in the north of 
Ireland, had total assets of just over £4.25 million, and had 1015 shareholders.
22 
Only one other bank in Ireland (the National Bank) had more branches than the 
UBC, and the UBC was a lot larger, in terms of branches and asset size, than the 
average English provincial bank.
23  Furthermore, the UBC had considerably 
more shareholders than the average English provincial bank, and just slightly 
less than the average Irish or Scottish bank. The average number of 
shareholders for each group in 1875 was as follows: Irish banks (1535),   
Scottish banks (1253) and English provincial banks (422). Indeed, only two 
English provincial banks had more shareholders than the UBC, the West of 
England and South Wales Bank (1808) and the Manchester and Liverpool 
District Bank (1250).
24    
 
The management organisation of the UBC was advanced in that it consisted of 
four directors answerable to a shareholders’ committee which had seven 
members. Directors, at their discretion, continued in office unless they were 
voted off by two-thirds of the shareholders (Barrow, 1975, p.130). In contrast, 
the shareholders’ committee was elected annually, but from the minute books of 
the bank in fact two members of this committee were replaced annually.
25 The 
shareholders’ committee generally met fortnightly, and one of their main orders 
of business comprised the authorisation of share transfers.   
 
The period chosen for our study (October 1874 to December 1879) is interesting 
for several reasons.  Firstly, trading in unlimited liability bank shares would 
have been highly developed by this stage given that the unlimited liability joint 
stock bank had been in existence for nearly half-a-century.   Secondly, these 
were the final years of unlimited liability banking, as across the British Isles 
there was a general move by banks to limited liability after 1879.  Finally, 
during the period of our study, the City of Glasgow Bank, a prominent 
unlimited liability Scottish bank, failed.
26  Following the collapse of this bank 
and the bankruptcy of the majority of its shareholders, there was a widespread 
concern across the British Isles that the wealthy shareholders of unlimited joint  
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stock banks would sell their shares to less wealthy investors or even transfer 
them to impecunious individuals (Levi, 1880, p.476; Gregory, 1936, p.212; 
Clapham, 1944, p.311; Alborn, 1998, p.135). Indeed, if the post-sale-extended 
liability requirement was an ineffective restriction for preventing shareholders 
selling to individuals with substantially less surplus wealth, then one would 
expect this to be especially apparent after the City of Glasgow failure.  
 
The exact start date for our study (1
st October, 1874) was determined by the first 
entry in the relevant share transfer journal (October marked the beginning of the 
bank’s financial year).  Our study stops at the end of 1879, as by this stage, 
there was the genesis of a general move to limited liability by banks, and the 
expectation that banks were going to convert to limited liability had already 
been incorporated into bank share prices (Hickson and Turner, 2001).   
 
The average monthly share prices displayed in Figure 1 were calculated using 
prices reported in the Ulster Banking Company’s Committee and General 
Meeting Minute Book (1864-1879).
27 The average share price in October 1874 
was £10.2s.10d., peaking in September 1876 at £12.13s.0d., and falling by 
December 1879 to £10.17s.2d.. Indeed, an influential contemporary view was 
that banks like the UBC, with substantially lower than average share prices, 
would be the most susceptible to surplus wealth dilution (Thomas, 1936, p.100). 
For example, in October 1874, the share prices of the other six major Irish 
unlimited liability joint stock banks ranged from £30.10s.0d. to £125.10s.0d., 
with an average share price of £78.2s.5d..
28  Indeed, of all the English and 
Scottish banks reported in Dun’s comprehensive statistical study of British 
banking, only one has a lower share price than the UBC. 
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From Figure 1, it can be seen that the share price trended upwards until the 
decision to issue new share capital in 1877. Unsurprisingly, the share price fell 
over the next few months, but recovered again until early 1878, after which time 
it was relatively stationary until the City of Glasgow crisis occurring the end of 
October 1878.  Similar to the pattern displayed by other banks, the share price 
fell 13.6%, between October 1878 and January 1879 (Baker and Collins, 1999, 
p.430). The dramatic decline in the price of bank shares was also mirrored in the 




4. Data on Ulster Banking Company Investor Profiles 
 
The UBC’s share transfer journal contains the following information: the 
buyer’s and seller’s name, buyer’s address and occupation / social status, 
whether seller was deceased, and number of shares transferred. Unfortunately, 
the share transfer journal does not report the share price associated with each 
transfer.  Nevertheless these prices were recorded in the minute books of the 
UBC’s shareholders’ committee.
30  In many cases, shares were gratuitously 
transferred for a fee (to cover stamp duty) of ten shillings per share. 
 
In our sample period, there were 1222 individuals and 68 married couples who 
invested in UBC shares.
31  From the 1874 shareholder list contained in that 
year’s published accounts, it was found that only 286 of the identified 1290 
investors were shareholders prior to the start of our sample period.
32  F r om  
Table 1, we can see that the majority of investors in our sample period 
accumulated between eleven and one hundred shares, with the median number 
of shares accumulated being twenty.   
 
Table 1. Share Accumulation Per Investor, Oct 1874 – Dec 1879 
 
Average number of shares 
accumulated 
51.76 
Standard deviation  114.24 
Median number of shares 
accumulated 
20 
% Investors with less than 10 
shares 
31.6 
% Investors with 11-50 shares 45.3 
% Investors with 51-100 shares 13.2 
% Investors with >100 shares 9.8 
Note: A small number of shares were jointly owned by two and sometimes three 
individuals.  No allowance is made for this fact in the above figures.  
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From Table 2, it can be seen that for our sample period there were 1881 
transfers of UBC shares, giving only an average of approximately 1.5 transfers 
per working day.  Unsurprisingly, after the issuance of share capital in 1877, the 
frequency and volume of transfers increased
33, but the increase in trading 
activity, particularly in 1879, could also be due to shareholder concerns 
following the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878.  From Table 2, it can 
also be seen that just under half of all the shares transferred in the period were 
transferred gratuitously, with 65.43% transferred to relatives bearing the same 
surname as that of the transferor.  As this figure stayed the same after the City of 
Glasgow failure, we can infer that shares weren’t necessarily dumped on 
unrelated impecunious individuals in this period.
34 
 
Table 2. Frequency and Volume of Trading in Ulster Banking Company Shares, 
1874-1879 
 
 Transfers  made 
gratuitously 
Transfers for monetary 
consideration 
Total   
 
  frequency volume frequency volume  average 
size of 
transfer 
frequency volume  average 
size of 
transfer 
          
1874
1  16 1,257 55  811  14.7  71 2,068  29.1 
1875  49  3,046  270  4,653 17.2  319  7,699 24.1 
1876  51  2,862  249  3,892 15.6  300  6,754 22.5 
1877
2  74  5,335  192  2,696 14.0  266  8,031 30.2 
1878  66  3,734  332  5,704 17.2  398  9,438 23.7 
1879 68 7,218  459  8,089  17.6  527  15,307  29.0 
          
Total  324  23,452 1,557 25,845  -  1,881 49,297  - 
1 The data for 1874 starts at the beginning of October. 
2 The figures for 1877 exclude transfers of the newly issued ‘a’ shares. 
 
In order to estimate the wealth of the 1290 UBC investors included in our 
sample period, we use the terminal value of their wealth as recorded in probate 
records.  This approach has the obvious drawback of not capturing the actual 
wealth of the investor at the time of share purchase.  For example, of the thirty 
shareholders in our sample whose terminal wealth was less than £200, eleven 
actually owned shares having a greater value than their bequeathed estate.     
Indeed, due to life-cycle effects, the terminal wealth of an investor will 
generally underestimate their wealth at the time they bought UBC shares. The 
existence of inter vivos gifts may also lead to an underestimation of the terminal 
wealth of the testator.  In addition, the testator’s wealth may be underestimated 
in order to evade death duties, as would be especially easy if the testator’s 
business was a partnership (Rubenstein, 1977, p.603-4).    
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Another drawback of our approach is that the majority of property owners did 
not leave wills in this period because property was transferred in testate or inter 
vivos. This becomes particularly problematic when certain types of investors are 
less likely to leave wills than others.  For example, merchants may have been 
more likely to pass their business unto an heir before dying.  In addition, 
spinsters would have a lower propensity to leave wills as the property 
bequeathed to them in their father’s will would frequently have contained an 
entail enforceable through legal or social restrictions. 
 
Fortunately, the UBC’s share transfer journals record whether a particular seller 
was deceased.  Searching through the share transfer journals from 1874 to 1898 
(this was the last year which was available for public inspection), we found that 
close to 200 of our 1290 investors died during this time period.  Using this 
information, we examined the relevant Will Calendar book to ascertain if the 
deceased had left a will.
35 By this method, we identified the probated wills of 84 
of our possible 1290 investors.  
 
In order to find the wills of the remaining investors, we searched the Ulster 
Historical Foundation’s database which contains an index of the probated wills 
and letters of administration in Ireland for the years 1878 to 1900.  We also 
searched various indexes located in the Public Record Office of Northern 
Ireland: the Index to the Belfast Wills and Administrations 1900-1908, the Index 
to the Belfast Wills and Administrations 1900-1908, and the Index to the 
Armagh Wills and Administrations 1901-1908.  All the above will indexes 
typically only report the deceased’s name, county of residence and year of 
probate.  Of the names in these indexes matching those of our investors, we only 
accepted those having the same address and occupation / social status as 
recorded in the UBC share transfer journals.  Using the above database and 
indexes, we identified the probated wills of a further 360 investors. Therefore, in 
total, we identified the probated wealth of 444 of our 1290 investors. This 
proportion is remarkable given that in 1879, the Irish Will Calendar contains 




The average year of probate for our sample was 1890, with the median being 
1889.  The probate date for 40 of our investors was in the 1870’s; the probate 
date of a further 198 was in the 1880’s, with 133 in the 1890’s, and 73 in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. As there was a low rate of inflation from 
1879 to 1910, we do not convert our terminal wealth figures into real terms.   
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5. The Wealth, Occupations and Social Status of UBC Investors 
 
In this section, we contrast the evidence drawn from our sample against 
Bagehot’s hypothesis.  The information in Table 3 lists the occupations or social 
status of our 1290 UBC investors.  Table 3 indicates that just over thirty per cent 
of these investors were widows or spinsters, although between them they only 
purchased 26.3 per cent of the shares in the period.  Nevertheless, we also 
observe that by far the largest group of investors in terms of the number of 
shares purchased were merchants who bought nearly 3000 more shares than 
spinsters and nearly double the number of shares bought by widows.  The 
professional classes as a whole were the next largest group in terms of number 
of shares purchased, buying nearly 2000 more shares than the spinsters group.  
We also observe that the average and median number of shares accumulated 
over our sample period was greater for the merchants, professionals and 
gentlemen than the spinsters or widows group.   
 
From a first glance, we see that very few shares were sold to individuals from 
the lower middle classes or below.  The twenty-seven bank clerks may have 
been from wealthy banking or mercantile families, perhaps being groomed for 
higher office in the bank.   Notably, there are only twenty-two individuals in the 
tradesmen category, accumulating only 1.2% of the shares traded in the period.  
However, these individuals, although categorised by the UBC as builders and 
butchers etc., could have been entrepreneurs, owning their own businesses. 
 
From the information in Table 4, UBC investors, on average, bequeathed £5368, 
and median wealth of our investors was £1,971.  Table 4 indicates that the 
majority of our investors had less than £5,000 of wealth, but eleven per cent of 
our 444 investors bequeathed wealth greater than £10,000.  Furthermore, as can 
also be seen in Table 4, the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank did not lead to a 
reduction in the quality of individual entering the membership of the UBC.   
Indeed, it appears that, if anything, the average wealth of investors entering the 
UBC rose during this period, reflecting perhaps that depositors had become 
more risk averse following the City of Glasgow crisis.     
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Table 3. Occupations / Social Status of Investors, 1874-1879 
 
  % of shares 
accumulated 
in the period 
Number of 
investors 






Median number of 
shares accumulated










5.5 47  3.6 78.4 
(191.5) 
22.5 
Clergymen  4.9 66  5.1 49.8 
(98.7) 
23.5 
Doctors  3.5 37  2.9 63.1 
(112.9) 
20.0 
Bank managers  3.1 22  1.7 95.0 
(213.0) 
34.5 
Solicitors  1.9 18  1.4 68.8 
(60.8) 
49.5 




3  13.4 152  11.8  59.1 
(117.3) 
25.0 
Widows  10.2 143  11.1  47.7 
(116.8) 
20.5 
Farmers  9.5 187  14.5 33.9 
(32.4) 
21.0 






1.2 34  2.6 23.3 
(27.9) 
15.5 








6  0.7 20  1.6 24.0 
(41.7) 
10.0 
Army and Police 
officers 
0.5 14  1.1 23.2 
(26.0) 
12.0 
No occupation or 
status recorded 
(male) 
3.5 41  3.2 59.0 
(96.4) 
20.0 
No occupation or 
status recorded 
(female) 
1.7 20  1.6 56.5 
(83.5) 
25.0 
TOTAL 100  1290  100     
Notes. Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations.  Some shares were jointly owned by two and 
sometimes three individuals.  No allowance is made for this fact in the above figures.   
1 This category consists of solicitors, doctors, bank managers, clergymen and other professional 
occupations.  
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2  This category includes Accountants, Auctioneers, Bankers, a Barrister, a Chemist, a Designer, 
Engineers, Insurance agents, Managers in public and private sectors, Stockbrokers.  
3  These are mainly men living off rental income. 
4  This category includes Bookkeepers, Clerks, Commercial Travellers, Salesmen, Muslin agents, 
Warder of jail. 
5 This category includes a Bank porter, Builders, Butchers, Caretaker, Carpenters, Gardeners, a 
Mechanic, Servants, a Stonemason.    
6  This includes 4 School Inspectors. 
 
 
Table 4. The Wealth of Investors in the Ulster Banking Company, 1874-79 
 
PART A: Statistics   
Number of wills  444 









PART B: Distribution of wealth 
  % of total number of investors with wills 
Less than £200  30 6.8 
£201-500 48 10.8 
£501-£1000 64 14.4 
£1001-£2000 91 20.5 
£2001-£3000 64 14.4 
£3001-£10,000 98 22.1 
£10,001-£20,000 16 3.6 
£20,000-£50,000 29 6.5 
>£50,001 4 0.9 
 
PART C: Impact of City of Glasgow failure on wealth profile 
Number of wills of shareholders 
who bought shares 1
st November 
1878 to 31
st December 1879 
180 
Average wealth  £6,369 
Standard deviation  £9,971 
Median £2,175 
% bequeathing wealth < £1000  27.8 
 
 
In order to get a measure of the relative wealth of our investors with respect to 
the population leaving wills during the late nineteenth century, we took a 
sample of wills from the Will Calendar book for 1889; that year being the 
median year of probate for our 444 investors who left wills.37  The average 
probated wealth of our sample individuals was £2,277 compared to £5,368 for 
the UBC investors.38  Notably, repeating this procedure using the Will  
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Calendar for 1879 yielded similar results.39  Using the Welch (1938) 
procedure, the difference in means is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence interval.  In addition, 82.1% of the sampled individuals left less than 
£1000 of probated wealth, whereas 68% of UBC investors bequeathed estates 
valued at greater than £1000.   
 

















Gentlemen  8,262 
(14,719) 
2,647 19.3  57  36.3 
Merchants  7,588 
(10,317) 
3,288 27.3  66  40.2 
Professionals  7,072 
(14,229) 
2,609 20.4  93  48.9 
Ministers  2,119 
(2166) 
1,500 31.6  38  57.6 
Doctors  5,923 
(7463) 






3,000 23.5  17  36.2 
Solicitors  28,801 
(30,049) 
20,152.5  0 10 55.6 
Bank managers  3,943 
(3600) 
2,653 12.5  8  36.4 
Tradesmen  7,072 
(12,078) 
1,577 50.0  6  27.3 
Spinsters  3,108 
(5113) 
1,356 41.2  51  19.9 
Farmers  2,871 
(4,999) 
1,299 34.9  86  46.0 
Widows  1,766 
(2073) 
941 52.5  61  42.7 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  See notes to Table 3. 
 
The wealth characteristics of the main occupational / social status categories are 
reported in Table 5.  Although, spinsters were less likely to leave wills than 
other investor categories, they were on average, relatively wealthy.   
Unsurprisingly, widows have the lowest average wealth with just over half of 
the widows having less than £1000 when they died.  Notably, half of our sample 
of investors with estates smaller than £200 were either widows or spinsters, 
placing them at the bottom end of the wealth distribution of our sample.   
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While Table 3 shows that gentlemen, merchants and professionals accumulated 
52.8% of the shares in our sample period, Table 5 reveals that these three 
occupational categories were, on average, the wealthiest.  Furthermore, these 
three categories have the lowest percentage of investors bequeathing less than 
£1000. Notably, as can also be seen from Table 5, the tradesmen leaving wills 
were relatively wealthy individuals, which gives some support to our earlier 
claim that they may in fact have been entrepreneurs with their own businesses.   
 
The above evidence strongly supports the view that the investors in the UBC 
were relatively wealthy individuals when compared to other members of society 
leaving wills.  Notably, the total wealth of our 444 shareholders constitutes 63% 
of the UBC’s total liabilities to the public in 1879, when the bank had 1454 
shareholders.
40  The evidence in this section suggests that Bagehot’s hypothesis 
does not hold, and supports our argument in section two that one should not 
expect the dilution of wealth which backs shares in unlimited liability joint stock 
banks.   
 
6. The Importance of Information and the Transfer of Shares 
 
As noted above, a major provision of the 1825 Banking Copartnership 
Regulation Act was the post-sale-extended liability requirement. As the 
provision would have forced a seller to internalise more any potential pecuniary 
externality stemming from the sale of ownership share, a priori we should 
expect that there was less need for the governing body to vet all share sales. 
However, as we argued above, the provision was at its most effective in 
recessionary periods, suggesting that an initial owner would have an incentive to 
offload his shares before any downturn. Indeed, such a strategy would have 
become easier when the post-sale-extended liability requirement was reduced to 
one year following re-registration under the 1862 Companies Act. This 
argument obviously depends on depositors not adjusting their risk premium 
immediately on dilution, and it also becomes less likely if the large shareholders 
attempted to exit. Thus to prevent surplus wealth dilution would have required 
the governing body to vet all shares in every period, particularly in good times. 
This argument implies that both the seller and the governing body both incur the 
cost stemming from opportunistic sales.  In particular, we should expect a 
consistent level of vetting by the committee over all periods, and the individual 
to be particularly circumspect during periods of increased probability of bank 






Table 6. The Proximity of Buyers and Sellers of Ulster Bank Shares, 1874-79 
 
Number of share transactions     
  >20 miles  between  10 
and 20 miles 
< 10 miles  No data  Total 
1874
































































Volume of share sales 
1874






























































1 The data for 1874 starts at the beginning of October. 
2 The figures for 1877 exclude transfers of the newly issued ‘a’ shares. Note: Distance was measured 
as the crow flies.  These figures exclude transfers that were made for nominal sums, usually to 
relatives.  There were thirty-seven transactions for which we have no address for buyer or seller. 
 
Given the information-gathering technology existing in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, one would expect shareowners to obtain, at a lower cost, 
information on prospective buyers living in close proximity. We therefore use 
the proximity of buyers and sellers of UBC shares as a proxy for the amount of 
information acquired. In Table 6 proximity was calculated by measuring the 
distance between (as the crow flies) buyers’ and sellers’ location. The addresses 
of the sellers were obtained from the shareholder lists contained in the UBC’s 
annual reports.
41  One validation of the usefulness of this measure is examine 
whether the size of trades is greater the further apart the buyer lives from the 
seller.  One would expect that the costs of information gathering for trade are  
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fixed. Notably, there were 649 trades where more than ten shares were 
transferred; 61.9% of these took place between individuals living more than 20 
miles apart, while only 26.3% took place between individuals living less than 
ten miles apart. 
 
Table 6 indicates that the majority of trades were between individuals not living 
in close proximity.  It is also worth noting that only 25.18% of trades and 
28.54% of shares sold in our sample period took place between individuals 
living in the same county. Significantly, in 1879, the year following the City of 
Glasgow failure, these figures increased to 26.57% and 32.77% respectively.  
Indeed, these findings are supported by other evidence suggesting that it was 
common for the sale of Irish bank shares to be advertised in national 
newspapers.
42  Notably, as can be seen in Table 6, between 1878 and 1879, there 
was a sharp decrease in the percentage of share trades and volume of share sales 
taking place between individuals living more than twenty miles apart. Thus, 
even though more shares were sold after the City of Glasgow failure, the 
evidence indicates that sellers gathered more information in this period, 
suggesting that the post-sale-extended liability requirement was effective in 
preventing opportunistic exiting. 
      
Before we examine the evidence relating to the acquisition by the governing 
body of the UBC of information on new owners, we first explore their incentive 
to do so by looking at their wealth and share-owning characteristics.  The UBC 
had four directors and a shareholders’ committee comprised of seven men and 
during our sample period, sixteen different men served on the committee.  From 
Table 7, we see that collectively these men owned 25,980 shares, constituting 
21.65% of the UBC.  Moreover, these men were the largest shareholders with 
the top five largest shareholders participating in the governance of the UBC.  
Furthermore, in our sample period, seven of the top ten largest shareholders and 
twelve of the top fifteen all served either as members of the shareholders’ 
committee or as directors.  Conversely, only three of the twenty men listed in 
Table 7 were ranked outside the thirty largest shareholders.
43  Finally, although 
thirteen of the thirty largest shareholders failed to serve on the shareholders’ 
committee in our sample period, we note that of these, nine were either widows 
or spinsters, the others being composed of two merchants and two gentlemen.  
Indeed, one of these gentlemen had served on the shareholders’ committee prior 
to our sample period.   
 
Fortunately, we were able to obtain the probated wills of all the directors and 
seven of the committee members.  Table 7 clearly shows that these individuals 
were very wealthy relative to other investors in the UBC.  Indeed, the total 
wealth of the ten who left wills was nearly one-quarter of the wealth of our  
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sample of 444 investors.  As predicted by our argument above, the evidence 
clearly shows that the members of the UBC governing bodies tended to be both 
the wealthiest and largest shareholders. 
 
The above finding that the governing body of the bank predominately consists 
of the largest and wealthiest shareholders indicates that the unlimited liability 
joint stock bank may not suffer from the same kind of collective action 
problems associated with diffused ownership limited liability firms.  Indeed, as 
we argued above in section 2, each individual shareholder’s expected return 
increases with share of ownership, but paradoxically, the UBC’s deed of co-
partnership restricted an individual’s share of ownership to a maximum of 2%.  
It is noteworthy that at least four co-owners approach this ceiling.  One can 
rationalise this bank-imposed restriction on the basis that diversifying the 
collective surplus wealth efficiently across individuals, ceteris paribus, gives 
greater assurance to depositors. 
 
We now turn to the access of the UBC’s governing body to information 
regarding prospective owners. One likely possibility is that this body acquired 
detailed information regarding prospective owners on the basis of their access to 
intimate knowledge of local property owners. As one would expect, the vast 
majority of the men serving on this committee lived in Belfast or close to 
Belfast.  Nevertheless, they may have been able to use the branch network to 
gain information on potential investors. Consequently, we use distance from a 
branch as a proxy for the degree of information gathered on potential investors. 
From Table 8, we note that the vast majority of our 1290 investors lived within 
10 miles of the nearest UBC branch and only twenty-three lived outside of 
Ireland, confirming the possibility that the branch network served as a source of 
information.
44  Other evidence in support of the branch system serving as an 
information network is that, while over 75% of our investors lived in the six 
northern counties of Ireland, not all this area was covered by UBC branches.
45  
For example, there were twenty-seven branches in the six northern counties, but 
there were no branches in large parts of North and East Antrim, South Down, 
Tyrone and much of Derry.  Indeed these areas tended to be served by the two 
other major banks in the north of Ireland (Belfast Banking Company and 
Northern Banking Company).
46      
 
Interestingly, in each annual report of the shareholders’ committee, owners were 
exhorted with missionary-like zeal to do all that they could to increase the 
circulation and deposits of the bank.
47 Given such exhortations, one can deduce 
that many shareholders were also customers of the bank.  If so, the UBC in this 
era would have been similar in this respect to other British banks (Holmes and 
Green, 1986, p.71).           
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Table 7.  Shareholders’ Committee and Directors of the Ulster Banking 
Company, 1874-79 
 
1 Number of shareholders in 1878 = 1605 
2 Some of these individuals did not buy shares in our sample period; therefore their wealth 
figures are not included in our wealth estimates in Tables 4 and 5. 
3 This gentleman was living in England when he died, and £8,730 is just the value of his 
estate in Ireland.  Indeed, the value of his UBC shares alone would have exceeded this total.   
Sources: 
UBC Returns of Shareholders, 1878 (PRONI D/3499/CB/2). 














1  Henry J. McCance  3,407  43,821 
2 William  Gillis  3,240  - 
3  William J. C. Allen  2,650  46,686 
4 William  C.  Heron  2,483  75,068 
5  Edward. C. Porter  1,742  - 
7  Joseph M. Lynn  1,563  - 
9 James  Carr  1,200  68,114 
11 James  Lee  1,146  - 
12 William  Campbell  1000  - 
13  Joseph Bigger   984  25,000 
14 James  Coleman  963  8,730
3 
15 John  Heron  960  - 
17 Francis  R.  Lepper  840  172,915 
23 Nicholas  Oakman  758  43,046 
24 John  Crawford  719  22,035 
27 Charles  Duffin  615  - 
28 William  Wann  600  - 
33 Samuel  Kingan  564  - 
71 Daniel  O’Rorke  296  15,353 
85= James  Henry  250 30,942 
      
 TOTAL  25,980  551,710  
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TABLE 8. Distance of Investors from Ulster Banking Company Branches 
 
    % of total 
shareholders 
investors who lived  <10 miles 
from nearest branch 
1189 92.17 
investors who lived between 10 and 
20 miles from nearest branch 
55 4.26 
investors who lived further than 20 
miles from nearest branch 
40 3.10 
investors who lived outside Ireland  23  1.78 
investors for which there is no 
address recorded 
6 0.5 
Notes. distance was measured as the crow flies. 
 
We now explore the possibility that the shareholders’ committee was willing to 
admit less wealthy investors when appropriately compensated through some 
type of price discrimination mechanism.  At first glance we note that there was 
little variation each month in the share prices paid by investors.  The monthly 
standard deviations of share prices ranged from zero to £0.6557, with the 
average for the sixty-three months being £0.1189.  Yet, when we take into 
account the events associated with the issuance of new share capital and the City 
of Glasgow failure, this average falls to £0.0993.  Notably, only in nine of the 
months of our sample period did the standard deviation of share prices exceed 
£0.20, with five of these being the above-mentioned exceptional periods.    
 
To account for general share price trends, we calculated a premium by first 
subtracting the average monthly share price away from the share price paid by 
each investor, and then dividing this figure by the share price paid by each 
investor.  Given price discrimination exists, one should find that the wealthier 
investors pay a negative premium and the less wealthy pay a positive premium.  
The mean value of this premium is 0.059% with a standard deviation of 1.407 
and a kurtosis equal to 5.516.  Nevertheless, since the premium ranges from 
6.411% to –8.945%, we explore below the possibility that these premiums are 
associated with differential prices based on wealth.     
 
As indicated in Table 1, the total number of transfers for monetary consideration 
during the period under review was 1557, and of these, 561 transfers were made 
to investors on whom we have probated wills.  Against the 561 shares transfers, 
we applied an OLS regression having the premium as our regressand.  Given 
that a price discrimination policy could have been directly applied not only  
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against wealth, but also on the basis of socio-economic status, we include as our 
regressors both probated wealth and dummy variables indicating occupational or 
social status.  In addition, we include a dummy variable to account for a City of 
Glasgow failure effect.  This dummy variable takes on a 0 value for the period 
before October 1878, and the value of 1 thereafter.   
 
Table 9. Regression Results: Price Discrimination 
 
  Dependent variable - Premium 
Regressors  
    
Wealth   -0.000009  -0.000008 
Constant 0.1155
**  0.1544 




Farmer     -0.2282 
Professional     0.0318 
Gentleman   -0.2700 
Merchant   -0.0692 
Spinster   -0.0115 
    
R
2  0.0054 0.0220 
    
Notes. The t-statistics are based on White’s heteroscedastic-corrected covariance matrix. 
** significant at the 5% level.  
* significant at the 10% level. 
N = 561. 
 
The regression results in Table 9 show that the coefficients on the wealth 
variable is extremely small and is statistically insignificant.  This finding 
provides little support for price discrimination based on investor’s wealth.   
Interestingly, only the widow dummy variable is significant and has a positive 
sign, suggesting that widows pay a higher premium than other investors.  The 
size of this coefficient indicates that this premium is relatively small, but an 
alternative interpretation may be that widows were less sophisticated than the 
other categories of investors.  Consistent with our previous findings, the City of 
Glasgow variable is also statistically insignificant.  




Our evidence from the UBC joint stock bank indicates that that the governing 
body of the bank, operating under the post-sale-extended liability legal 
requirement, successfully ensured that ownership was not transferred to those 
who have ‘but few acres and few shillings’.  The evidence, drawn from the 
period after the City of Glasgow failure, also indicates that wealth dilution was 
particularly prevented in times of increased bank distress.  Therefore, it appears 
from our evidence that Bagehot’s conjecture that unlimited liability bank owners 
were impecunious was mistaken. Significantly, the Joint Stock Companies 
Registration and Regulation Act (1844), which for the first time freely permitted 
all firms to constitute on a joint stock basis, also imposed a post-sale-extended 
liability requirement on the transfer of shares.
48 
 
We also find little evidence of a price discrimination policy for share transfers.  
On the contrary, the evidence indicates that the bank preferred to acquire 
information on potential shareowners through their branch network, as 
evidenced by our proximity measure between buyers and UBC branches.  Also 
contrary to Bagehot’s conjecture, we find that the governing body of the UBC 
consisted of the largest and wealthiest shareowners. This ensured that the 
governing body of the bank had sufficient incentives to enforce minimum 
wealth requirements for all investors.  As this would have required substantial 
information regarding potential owners, this is consistent with our finding that 
for the majority of trades in our sample period, the buyers and sellers lived more 




1 The reluctance to permit to form freely on a joint stock basis in Great Britain 
and Ireland may have been partially due to the conservative nature of the 
common law  (Cottrell, 1980, p.45; Harris, 2000, p.78). 
2 Irish Banking Copartnerships Regulation Act (1825), 6 Geo. IV, c.42. 
3 Banking Copartnerships Act (1826), 7 Geo. IV, c.46. 
4 The Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act (1844), 7/8 Vict., 
c.110.  Harris (2000, p.284) states that “for the first time in at least 500 
years corporations could be formed without explicit, deliberated and 
specific State permission”.  However, firms could only freely incorporate 
as limited liability companies under An Act for Limiting the Liability of 
Members of Certain Joint Stock Companies (1855), 18/19 Vict., c.113.  
This Act was repealed, but re-enacted in 1856 (Hunt, 1936, p.134).  The 
re-enactment was entitled An Act for the Incorporation and Regulation of 
Joint Stock Companies, and other Associations (1856), 19/20 Vict., c.47.  
The privilege of limited liability was extended to banks under the Joint 
Stock Banking Companies Act (1857), 21/22 Vict., c.49. 
5 Prior to the establishment of joint stock banks, note-issuing banks in Ireland 
and England were restricted to partnerships with less than six partners 
(Hall, 1949, p.37, Richards, 1929, p.147).  The move to joint stock 
banking was preceded by numerous banking failures.   In Ireland in 1820, 
nearly half the commercial banks failed (Hall, 1949, p.37).  In 1825, sixty 
English banks failed which accounted for 7.5% of all banks (Pressnell, 
1956, p.538).  A possible explanation for the failure of these banks is that 
the six-partner restriction meant that banks were small and 
undercapitalised making them less robust to economic downturns 
(Ó’Gráda, C., 1994, p.139).   
6 Professor Leone Levi, writing in the Bankers’ Magazine, expresses the view 
that the personal wealth of the unlimited liability bank shareholders acted 
to ‘inspire unlimited confidence’ in depositors (Levi, 1880, p.476).   
Indeed, many established bankers, sharing Levi’s views, believed that 
unlimited liability gave their banks prestige (The Bankers’ Magazine, 
“Banking Capital and Limited Liability”, Sept. 1882, p.717).
  
7 For example, see Bagehot’s  Unfettered Banking,  The Safest Bank, Sound 
Banking, Limited Liability in Banking -  I, Limited Liability in Banking II. 
8 Bagehot, Unfettered Banking, p.312. 
9 Ibid., p.312. 
10 In 1879, The Economist, arguing in the spirit of Bagehot, stated ‘that the 
unlimited liability of the wealthy may be expected to prove as good if not 
a better security to the depositor as the unlimited liability of the poor’. 
“Banks and Limitation of Liability”, Economist, 25
th October 1879.  
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11 Some of the main contributions in the law literature include Halpern et al 
(1980), Hansmann and Kraakman (1991, 1992), Grundfest (1992), 
Presser (1992). 
12 See Alchian and Woodward, 1988, p.71; Carr and Mathewson (1988, p.769); 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 331; Winton (1993, p.480,500); Woodward 
(1985, p.601).  Notably, Manne (1967, p.262) argued that investments in 
unlimited liability firms would tend to come from investors who were 
nearly insolvent and wealthy individuals would almost never invest in 
such a firm. 
13 Grossman (1995) in a study of the market for shares in American Express 
does not discuss the mechanisms used to deal with the problems of 
trading in unlimited liability shares, and indeed, Grossman’s evidence 
suggests that there were no restrictions on resale or little monitoring of 
transfers.  However, American Express had pro rata unlimited liability 
where each shareholder’s liability is determined by the amount they own, 
implying that there would be no need for restrictions on resale or costly 
monitoring of other shareholders.  Indeed, Grossman’s study does not 
contain convincing evidence that shares were not in the hands of those 
whose wealth would be insufficient to cover any claims made upon the 
firm. 
14 Grossman (1995, p.68) and Kraakman (1998, p.651).   
15 Several scholars have argued that wealthier shareholders may engage in 
monitoring activities to ensure that other shareholders have sufficient 
wealth to meet any claims that would be made on the firm (Carr and 
Mathewson, 1988, p.769; Hansmann and Kraakman, 1991, p.1893). 
16 In this case, the bank could reduce the compensating risk premium it pays to 
depositors by accumulating idle resources in the form of reserves.  The 
bank would make its marginal decision to hold additional reserves by 
equating the marginal cost of doing so to the reduction in its risk 
premium. 
17 Winton (1993, p.480) suggests two possible solutions to the pecuniary 
externality we describe above.  Either forbid the sale of shares without 
approval by all shareholders or impose a post sale extended liability 
requirement.   
18 Section 13 of the Banking Copartnership Act imposed the same requirement 
upon shareholders of English banks.  However, the Companies Act of 
1862 permitted English and Irish banks to abandon their old co-
partnership constitutions and register as unlimited liability companies.   
One of  the main advantages of doing this was a reduction from three 
years to one year for which a member was liable after they had sold their 
shares. (Crick and Wadsworth, 1936, p.33).  
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19 Ulster Banking Company’s Share Transfer Journal (1874-1880) - PRONI 
D/3499/CC/3. 
20 We thank Dr. John Booker (Archivist at Lloyds-TSB) for pointing this out to 
us.  
21 AGM of 1867 - Ulster Banking Company’s Committee and General Meeting 
Minute Book (1864-1879) - PRONI D/3499/AA/2. 
22 Ulster Banking Company’s  Yearly Reports 1868-1881 - PRONI 
D/3499/AE/1. 
23 The average English provincial bank had eight branches and the average asset 
size of such banks was £2012.78.  Calculations based on data contained 
in Dun (1876). 
24 The average for Irish banks excluding the National Bank was 1183.  Figures 
are from Dun (1876).  
25 Ulster Banking Company’s Committee and General Meeting Minute Book 
(1864-1879) - PRONI D/3499/AA/2.  The Deeds of Copartnership of the 
Northern Banking Company stipulate that each year at least two members 
of the shareholders’ committee should be new members (PRONI 
D546/4).  Unfortunately, the UBC’s deeds have been lost, but the UBC’s 
deeds were modelled on the deeds of the Northern, explaining why we 
find at least two new members coming onto the board each year. 
26 The City of Glasgow Bank failed on the 1
st October 1878 with assets of 
£7,200,000 against liabilities of £12,400,000 (Checkland, 1975, p.741).  
The depositors and note-holders of this bank did not incur any losses, but 
after the bank’s liquidation, the majority of shareholders were insolvent 
(Checkland, 1975, p.471). 
27 PRONI D/3499/AA/2. 
28 Share prices obtained from Investors’ Monthly Manual, Oct. 1878. 
29 By July 1879, the Smith and Horne (1934) monthly index of industrial shares 
had fallen 13.8% from its level in October 1878.  
30 Ulster Banking Company’s Committee and General Meeting Minute Book 
(1864-1879) - PRONI D/3499/AA/2. 
31 A relatively small number of individuals jointly purchased shares in the bank 
and they are included in these figures. 
32 Ulster Banking Company’s  Yearly Reports 1868-1881 - PRONI 
D/3499/AE/1. 
33 The original capital of the bank was made up of 100,000 shares of £10 each, 
with one quarter paid-up, and there were approximately 800 shareholders 
(Knox, 1965, p.13).  On the 1
st September 1876, the shareholders 
resolved that the capital of the company should be increased by 100,000 
shares of £10 each (Knox, 1965, p.97).  Consequently, existing 
shareholders were offered twenty thousand shares in proportion of one  
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share for every five held at a price of £5 per share.  This meant that from 
1877 onwards, there were 120,000 issued shares.  Notably, the number of 
shareholders grew from 1015 in 1874 to 1454 in 1879. 
34 Between start of Nov. 1878 and end of Dec. 1879, 65.88% of shares were 
transferred to relatives having the same surname as that of the transferor. 
35 The Will Calendar books for Ireland can be found at the PRONI. 
36 The Will Calendar book for 1879 has 773, and on average each page has six 
entries.  With the passage of time, there appears to be a greater propensity 
for individuals to leave wills.  For example, in 1889, there were 
approximately 6700 probated wills in Ireland. 
37 The Will Calendar for 1889 had 747 pages with an average of nine entries per 
page.  We took the top three entries from each page which gave us the 
estates left by 2189 deceased individuals. 
38 The standard deviation for the sample was £37,897.78 and the median was 
£239.   
39 The average for 1879 was £2289.42, with a standard deviation of £11,820.98 
and a median of £450. 
40 The total public liabilities were £3,785,399.  Ulster Banking Company’s   
Yearly Reports 1868-1881 - PRONI D/3499/AE/1. 
41 Ulster Banking Company’s  Yearly Reports 1868-1881 - PRONI 
D/3499/AE/1. 
42 I thank Philip Ollrenshaw for this information. 
43 In 1878, only thirty-six UBC shareholders owned more than 500 shares.   
Ulster Banking Company’s  Return of Shareholders 1876-79 - PRONI 
D/3499/CB/2. 
44 The twenty-three investors who lived outside Ireland had mostly local 
connections or had emigrated from Ireland.  These twenty-three investors 
lived in Aberdeen, Keith, Stranraer, Dumfries, Glasgow (4), Liverpool 
(2), York, Kent (2), Sheffield, Leeds (3),London (2), Newark, 
Montpellier, Vienna and Massachusetts 
45 The investors in the north of Ireland are as follows: Belfast (268), Down 
(284), Antrim (199), Tyrone (147), Armagh (82), Derry (42), Fermanagh 
(21). 
46 The Northern Banking Company (NBC) had branches in North and East 
Antrim market towns (Ballyclare, Ballycastle, Ballycarry, Carrickfergus 
and Cushendall).  Much of Derry was covered by the two banks, with 
both banks having branches in Coleraine, Newtownlimavady and 
Magherfelt, and the NBC also having branches in Kilrea, Dungiven and 
Claudy.  South Down was covered by the two banks, with the NBC 
having branches in Ardglass, Castlewellan, Dromore, Gilford, 
Hillsborough and Newry, and the Belfast Banking Company (BBC)  
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having branches in Kilkeel, Newry, Portaferry, Rathfriland and Saintfield.  
The NBC had three Tyrone branches (Fintona, Fivemiletown, 
Newtownstewart), whilst the BBC had a branch in Dunngannon.   
47 Ulster Banking Company’s Committee and General Meeting Minute Book 
(1836-1864, 1864-1879) - PRONI D/3499/AA/1 and PRONI 
D/3499/AA/2. 
48 The Joint Stock Companies and Regulation Act (1844), 7/8 Vict., c.110.  
  28
References 
Alborn, T. L. (1998). Conceiving Companies: Joint-Stock Politics in Victorian 
England. London: Routledge. 
Alchian, A. A. and Woodward, S. (1988), “The Firm is Dead, Long Live the 
Firm.” Journal of Economic Literature, 26, 65-79. 
Bagehot, W. (1856a), “Sound Banking”, Saturday Review (Oct. 4th), In The 
Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, 1976, London: The Economist. 
Bagehot, W. (1856b), “Unfettered Banking”, Saturday Review (Nov. 1st), In 
The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, 1976, London: The Economist. 
Bagehot, W. (1857), “The Safest Bank”, The Economist (April 18th), In The 
Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, 1976, London: The Economist. 
Bagehot, W. (1862a), “Limited Liability in Banking - I”, The Economist (May 
17th), In The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, 1976, London: The 
Economist. 
Bagehot, W. (1862b), “Limited Liability in Banking - II”, The Economist (June 
21st), In The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, 1976, London: The 
Economist. 
Baker, M. and Collins, M. (1999), “Financial Crises and Structural Change in 
English Commercial Bank Assets, 1860-1913.” Explorations in 
Economic History, 36, 428-444. 
Barrow, G. L. (1975), The Emergence of the Irish Banking System, 1820-1845.  
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd.. 
Carr, J. L. and Mathewson, G. F. (1988), “Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to 
Entry.” Journal of Political Economy, 96, 766-784. 
Checkland, S. G. (1975), Scottish Banking A History, 1695-1973. Glasgow: 
Collins. 
Clapham, J. (1944), The Bank of England: A History. London: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cottrell, P. L. (1980). Industrial Finance, 1830-1914. London: Methuen. 
Crick, W. F. and Wadsworth, J. E. (1936), A Hundred Years of Joint Stock 
Banking. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
Dun, J. (1876). The banking institutions, bullion reserves, and non-legal-tender 
note circulation of the United Kingdom statistically investigated. Journal 
of the Statistical Society 39, pp. 1-189. 
Gregory, T. E. (1936), The Westminster Bank Through a Century. London: 
Westminster Bank Ltd. 
Grossman, P. Z. (1995), “The Market for Shares of Companies With Unlimited 
Liability: The Case of American Express.” Journal of Legal Studies, 24, 
63-85. 
Grundfest, J. A. (1992), “The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital 
Markets Perspective.” Yale Law Journal, 102, 387-425.  
  29
Hall, F. G. (1949).  The Bank of Ireland 1783-1946, Hodges, Figgis & Co,  
Dublin. 
Halpern, P., Trebilcock, M. and Turnbull, S. (1980), “An Economic Analysis of 
Limited Liability in Corporation Law.” University of Toronto Law Journal, 
30, 117-150. 
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (1991), “Toward Unlimited Liability for 
Corporate Torts.” Yale Law Journal, 100, 1879-1934. 
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (1992), “Do the Capital Markets Compel 
Limited Liability? A Response to Professor Grundfest.” Yale Law Journal, 
102, 427-36. 
Harris, R. (2000). Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business 
Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hickson, C. R. and Turner, J. D. (2001), “Shareholder Liability Regimes in 
English Banking: The Impact Upon the Market for Shares” 
Holmes, A. R. and Greene, E. (1986), Midland: 150 Years of Banking Business. 
London: BT Batsford Ltd.. 
Hunt, B. C. (1936), The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 
1800-1867, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. (1976). ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Capital Structure’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Levi, L. (1880), “The Reconstruction of Joint Stock Banks on the Principle of 
Limited Liability”, The Bankers’ Magazine, 40, 468-479. 
Knox, W.J. (1965), Decades of the Ulster Bank, 1836-1964. Belfast: Ulster 
Bank Limited. 
Kraakman, R. (1998), “Unlimited Liability”, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Law and Economics, P. Newman (editor). London: Macmillan. 
Manne, H.G. (1967), “Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics”, 
Virginia Law Review, 53, 259-284. 
Mitchell, B. R. (1988), British Historical Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Munn, C. W. (1981). The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies 1747-1864, 
John Donald, Edinburgh. 
Munn, C. W. (1988), Clydesdale Bank: The First One Hundred and Fifty Years. 
London; Collins. 
Ó’Gráda, C. (1994), Ireland: A New Economic History, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Ollerenshaw, P. (1987), Banking in Nineteenth Century Ireland: The Belfast 
Banks, 1825-1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Plumptre, C. C. M. (1882), Grant’s Treatise on the Law Relating to Bankers 
and Banking Companies. London: Butterworths.  
  30
Pressnell, L. S. (1956). Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Presser, S. B. (1992), “Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited 
Liability, Democracy and Economics”, Northwestern University Law 
Review, 87, pp.148-177. 
Richards, R. D. (1929), The Early History of Banking in England, London: P. S. 
King and Sons. 
Rubenstein, W.D. (1977), “The Victorian Middle Classes: Wealth, Occupation, 
and Geography”, Economic History Review, 33, pp.602-623. 
Simpson, N. (1975), The Belfast Bank 1827-1970. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. 
Smith, K. C. and Horne, G. F. (1934), “An Index Number of Securities, 1867-
1914.” Royal Economic Society Memorandum 47, London. 
Thomas, S. E. (1934). The Rise and Growth of Joint Stock Banking. London: Sir 
Issac Pitman and Sons. 
Welch, B. L. (1938), “The Significance of the Difference Between the Two 
Means When Population Variances Are Unequal”, Biometrika, 29, 350-
362. 
Winton, A. (1993), “Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the 
Firm.” Journal of Finance, 48, 487-512. 
Woodward, S. (1985), “Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 141, 601-611. 